| dc.contributor.author | ['Ariyono, Bagus Dwi', 'Setiyono, Bowo'] | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-09-23T07:58:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-09-23T07:58:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-09-16 00:00:00 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | - | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jieb/article/view/53110 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digilib.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/repo/handle/15717717/27441 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Introduction/Main Objectives: This study examines the effect of institutional ownership, proxied by government and private ownership, and bank monitoring on agency conflicts. Background Problems: The previous literature focused on agency conflicts, particularly those between managers and shareholders in developed markets, with much less evidence being presented from emerging ones. Novelty: We consider the role of creditors (the banks) in mitigating agency conflicts, and the managers’ irresponsible behavior, which in previous studies has been largely under-elaborated. Research Methods: Using 1,525 observations of 305 non-financial companies that were listed in the 2011-2015 period, we employ the generalized least squares method to deal with potential econometric concern such as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Finding/Results: We find that institutional ownership and bank monitoring, proxied by the number of banks and the share of their loans, are negatively related to agency conflicts. Conclusion: Banks and institutional ownership lead to lower agency conflicts. However, one should mitigate free-rider problems emanated from these relationships. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://jurnal.ugm.ac.id/jieb/article/view/53110/29125 | |
| dc.rights | ['Copyright (c) 2020 Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business', 'http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0'] | |
| dc.subject | ['Corporate finance, Banking', 'agency conflict, institutional ownership, government ownership, bank monitoring'] | |
| dc.title | Does Institutional Ownership and Bank Monitoring Affect Agency Conflicts? Evidence from an Emerging Market | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.identifier.oai | oai:jurnal.ugm.ac.id:article/53110 | |
| dc.journal.info | ['Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business (JIEB); Vol 35, No 3 (2020): September; 171-187', '2338-5847', '2085-8272'] | |
