| dc.contributor.author | Ethan A. Meyers | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jeremy D. Gretton | |
| dc.contributor.author | Joshua R. C. Budge | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jonathan A. Fugelsang | |
| dc.contributor.author | Derek J. Koehler | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-12-13T14:09:57Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-05-20T08:25:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-05-20T08:25:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-12-13T14:09:57Z | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297523000244/type/journal_article | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://digilib.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/repo/handle/15717717/48011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | People often overestimate their understanding of how things work. For instance, people believe that they can explain even ordinary phenomena such as the operation of zippers and speedometers in greater depth than they really can. This is called the illusion of explanatory depth. Fortunately, a person can expose the illusion by attempting to generate a causal explanation for how the phenomenon operates (e.g., how a zipper works). This might be because explanation makes salient the gaps in a person’s knowledge of that phenomenon. However, recent evidence suggests that people might be able to expose the illusion by instead explaining a different phenomenon. Across three preregistered experiments, we tested whether the process of explaining one phenomenon (e.g., how a zipper works) would lead someone to report knowing less about a completely different phenomenon (e.g., how snow forms). In each experiment, we found that attempting to explain one phenomenon led participants to report knowing less about various phenomena. For example, participants reported knowing less about how snow forms after attempting to explain how a zipper works. We discuss alternative accounts of the illusion of explanatory depth that might better fit our results. We also consider the utility of explanation as an indirect, non-confrontational debiasing method in which a person generalizes a feeling of ignorance about one phenomenon to their knowledge base more generally. | |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | |
| dc.subject.lcc | Social Sciences; Psychology | |
| dc.title | Broad effects of shallow understanding: Explaining an unrelated phenomenon exposes the illusion of explanatory depth | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.description.doi | 10.1017/jdm.2023.24 | |
| dc.title.journal | Judgment and Decision Making | |
| dc.identifier.oai | oai:doaj.org/journal:4e25fef7453b49498be088de41146c0b | |
